The research of the phenomenon of revolution from the point of view of relation between rational and irrational is considered to be an important problem field for history of philosophy and ethics. The present report offers an attempt of reconstruction of ethical philosophy of Baden school of Neo-Kantianism (W. Windelband, H. Rickert, E. Lask) as well as an attempt of putting it in perspective of possible methodological attitudes of the ethical analysis of the phenomenon of revolution. Continue reading
Most socio-cultural and civilizational innovations arose in the cities. At the same time cities have been and remain the main platforms for the deployment of different kinds of social conflicts. Continue reading
The article raises the problems of cultural diversity, as well as the transformation of multicultural values over many centuries. Significant influence on their formation had external and internal factors that could contribute to the emergence, development or death of various cultural values. The modern world is complex and diverse, the dynamic dramatic events of recent years have very Continue reading
In Ideas, Book I Husserl develops his mature theory of intentionality as the fundamental structure of consciousness composed of noetic, subjective moment on the one hand, and noematic, objective moment on the other. In other words, intentionality is the sense-bestowing relation between mental process and its objective correlate, its sense: the noema.
The notorious difficulty of Husserl’s passages on noetic-noematic structures prompted the contemporary debate about the role and ontological status of the noema. Continue reading
Some half a century before Freud, Hegel suggested that mental derangement (Verrücktheit) is a reversion to the earlier stages of the development of the soul and that it discloses the psychic origins of the mind to theoretical analysis. Freud never quotes Hegel and generally dismisses Hegelianism as the epitome of wild philosophical speculations. Continue reading
In recent decades, the heart of Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik––his enterprise of calling into the question and systematically substantiating all of thinking’s basic concepts and rules––has struck many commentators as outdated if not outright misguided.
In an effort to make Hegel’s thought relevant, Hegel studies have largely focused on the aspects of Hegel’s philosophy that are most compatible with our current philosophical climate. In contrast, however, my approach embraces Hegel’s philosophical radicalism. In my paper, I will first sketch out Hegel’s place within a broader tradition of what I term radical philosophy. Continue reading
My aim in this paper is to analyze Kant’s account, during the early 1760s, of the relation between judgment, distinctness of representations and ‘inner sense’. I will argue that Kant takes over and radically transforms important strands of Wolff’s thought on the same issues. Indeed, both Kant and Wolff define judgment with a view to the act of the mind performed therein.
Kant however rejects Wolff’s attempt to explain the possibility of judgment through the gradual accumulation of lower cognitive acts (such as attention, comparison, reflection). Judgment, Kant argues, is a specific way of relating Continue reading
The Logical Investigations is Husserl’s “breakthrough work”, which established the concepts and themes which he would go on to analyze throughout the rest of his career. Those Investigations start with an examination of the function of signs in expression. The goal of this paper is to briefly explicate the fundamentals of that theory.
To expedite this process, we will examine three relationships between different acts that are executed during the experience of expression. Continue reading
This paper primarily takes the form of an introduction to and a clarification of Husserl’s account of “phenomenological psychology”. This is a discipline that comes very close to phenomenology, and whose boundaries often seem to blur with those of phenomenology (and Husserl’s way of presenting such an account raises, rather than clarifying confusions).
Specifically, in this paper, I disambiguate between three different meanings of “phenomenological psychology” that, I claim, can be found in Husserl’s works. Continue reading
Both the notes of his 1927/8 Winter Seminar Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929) show that Heidegger’s phe-nomenological destruction of the Critique of Pure Reason ultimately serves a constructive purpose, namely, to uncover Kant’s tacit insights about the human condition. The most compelling passages from Phenomenological Interpretation and Kant and the Problem of Meta-physics deal, respectively, with those about the transcendental deduction of the categories of understanding and transcendental imagination in the Critique. Continue reading